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Note 
 
Moving Past Preemption: Enhancing the Power 
of Local Governments over Hydraulic Fracturing 
Rachel A. Kitze* 
In the last decade, hydraulic fracturing has transformed 
the energy outlook of the United States. Due to improvements 
in drilling technology, the United States now has access to 2214 
trillion cubic feet of natural gas resources,1 enough to last the 
country for nearly 100 years.2 As President Barack Obama 
stated, “We, it turns out, are the Saudi Arabia of natural gas. 
We’ve got a lot of it.”3 This unprecedented growth in natural 
gas production is due to recent advances in a drilling technique 
known as hydraulic fracturing (also called fracking, 
hydrofracking, fracing,4 or hydraulic fragmentation by one Io-
wan news station5
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St. Olaf College. Many thanks to Charlie Nauen of Lockridge Grindal Nauen, 
P.L.L.P. whose guidance and invaluable insights from years of experience as 
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you to the wonderful and talented board and staff of the Minnesota Law Re-
view, especially Ally Whelan and Emily Marshall for their dedication and hard 
work. I would also like to thank my friends and family, most importantly my 
parents, Barb and Phil, and my sister Sara for their love and encouragement. 
And my heartfelt thanks to Tim Collins, whose unwavering support and end-
less patience have sustained me throughout my time in law school. Copyright 
© 2013 by Rachel A. Kitze.  
). Deep wells are drilled up to 10,000 feet un-
 1. Mason Inman, Estimates Clash for How Much Natural Gas in the 
United States, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, Feb. 29, 2012, http://news 
.nationalgeographic.com/news/energy/2012/03/120301-natural-gas-reserves-
united-states/. 
 2. David B. Spence, Federalism, Regulatory Lags, and the Political Econ-
omy of Energy Production, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 433 (2013). 
 3. Barack Obama, President of the United States, Remarks by the Presi-
dent on American-Made Energy (Jan. 26, 2012), available at http://www 
.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/2012/01/26/president-obama-discusses 
-blueprint-american-made-energy#transcript. 
 4. See What Is Shale Gas and Why Is It Important?, U.S. ENERGY INFO. 
ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/energy_in_brief/article/about_shale_gas.cfm (last 
updated Dec. 5, 2012) [hereinafter EIA, What Is Shale Gas?]. 
 5. Chris Earl, Moratorium Vote Held Off on Allamakee County Frac 
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der the earth’s surface, and then horizontally for miles through 
the ground.6 Millions of gallons of water combined with chemi-
cals and sand are then forced into the well under high pressure, 
causing the rock to crack and allowing natural gas to escape.7
Although fracking has opened up access to a century’s 
worth of energy, local governments are increasingly concerned 
about the transformative effect of fracking on communities.
  
8 On 
September 22, 2012, thousands gathered in 150 cities across 
five continents to protest the global spread of hydraulic fractur-
ing and voice their concerns about increases in traffic, noise, 
water pollution, health risks, and the destruction of the charac-
ter of their local communities.9
The rapid expansion of fracking, combined with its nega-
tive effects on communities, has led to legal battles between 
state and local governments over who has the power to regulate 
it.
  
10 At the federal level, there are no comprehensive regula-
tions governing fracking.11 Consequently, state and local gov-
ernments have primary regulatory authority.12 Recently, state 
governments have sought to increase their control over the 
regulatory process by pushing the limits of the doctrine of state 
preemption.13
 
Sand Mining, KCRG.COM (Jan. 31, 2013), http://www.kcrg.com/news/local/ 
Moratorium-Vote-Held-Off-on-Allamakee-County-Sand-Mining-189315351 
.html. 
 Preemption allows state governments to simulta-
neously expand their own authority and reduce local govern-
 6. See EIA, What Is Shale Gas?, supra note 4. 
 7. See id. 
 8. See, e.g., Local Actions Against Fracking, FOOD & WATER WATCH, 
http://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/water/fracking/fracking-action-enter/local 
-action-documents/ (last visited Oct. 18, 2013) [hereinafter Local Actions] (list-
ing the cities and towns across the country that have implemented ordinances 
banning fracking).  
 9. See Over 150 Organizations to Call for Ban on Hydraulic Fracturing 
Through the Global Frackdown, ENEWS PARK FOREST (Sept. 21, 2012, 2:59 
PM), http://www.enewspf.com/latest-news/science-a-environmental/36765-over 
-150-organizations-to-call-for-ban-on-hydraulic-fracturing-through-the-global 
-frackdown.html. 
 10. See, e.g., Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 52 A.3d 463 (Pa. Commw. 
Ct. 2012) (deciding a challenge to the state preemption law). 
 11. See Spence, supra note 2, at 447. 
 12. See id. 
 13. See, e.g., 58 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3301–3309 (2013), available at http:// 
www.legis.state.pa.us/WU01/LI/LI/CT/PDF/58/58.PDF. However, Section 3304 
was held unconstitutional in Robinson Township, 52 A.3d at 485, for violating 
substantive due process by requiring municipalities to allow oil and gas opera-
tions in residential zoning districts. 
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ment authority.14 States often use preemption when they want 
to create a uniform regulatory environment, which allows in-
dustry to operate more efficiently.15 However, preemption se-
verely diminishes the ability of local governments to exercise 
their traditional powers of zoning and land use regulation to 
minimize the effects of industries like fracking on their com-
munities.16
In response to state’s attempts to exercise preemption, coa-
litions of concerned citizen groups and communities have 
brought lawsuits in state courts, with minimal success, in the 
hopes of retaining some control over fracking.
 
17 Although some 
states, such as Colorado, have made nominal attempts to incor-
porate local concerns into their regulations,18 these efforts are 
inadequate to protect communities.19
This Note argues that the current fracking regulatory sys-
tem is failing to protect the interests of local communities and 
that local governments must retain meaningful control over 
fracking because they are in the best position to understand 
how it affects their communities. Part I discusses how fracking 
affects local communities and describes the changing balance of 
regulatory power between state and local governments. Part II 
analyzes how preemption laws affect local communities’ ability 
 As a result, local govern-
ments across the country are powerless to stop, slow, or even 
control the use of fracking. 
 
 14. Paul S. Weiland, Preemption of Local Efforts to Protect the Environ-
ment: Implications for Local Government Officials, 18 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 467, 468 
(1999) [hereinafter Weiland, Preemption Implications] (explaining the defini-
tion of preemption). 
 15. See Paul S. Weiland, Federal and State Preemption of Environmental 
Law: A Critical Analysis, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 237, 242–43 (2000) [here-
inafter Weiland, Preemption Analysis] (describing the benefits of uniform en-
vironmental laws).  
 16. See, e.g., Range Res.-Appalachia, LLC v. Salem Twp., 964 A.2d 869 
(Pa. 2009) (holding that a township’s oil and gas regulation was preempted by 
state law). 
 17. See, e.g., Robinson Twp., 52 A.3d 463. 
 18. See Press Release, Office of Gov. John Hickenlooper, Oil and Gas Task 
Force Makes Recommendations Related to State and Local Regulatory Juris-
diction (Apr. 18, 2012), available at http://www.colorado.gov/cs/Satellite/ 
GovHickenlooper/CBON/1251621390178. 
 19. See Bob Berwyn, Colorado: Local Government Officials from Around 
the State Blast Gov. Hickenlooper over Longmont Drilling Lawsuit, SUMMIT 
CNTY. CITIZENS VOICE (Sept. 19, 2012), http://summitcountyvoice.com/2012/09/ 
19/colorado-local-government-officials-from-around-the-state-blast-gov 
-hickenlooper-over-longmont-drilling-lawsuit/ (showing that the task force has 
not prevented further disputes regarding local government control).  
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to protect their interests. It evaluates the outcomes of legal bat-
tles over fracking regulation, and critiques the few attempts to 
increase cooperation in the regulatory process. Part III propos-
es a solution that would substantially increase local govern-
ment control over fracking while allowing for the continued de-
velopment of the industry. It proposes a model for a formal 
organization which would bring community representatives 
and state decision makers together to create regulations to gov-
ern fracking. In the face of state preemption and the rapid ex-
pansion of this industry, such a mechanism would help local 
governments reclaim control over fracking and allow them to 
forcefully advocate for the protection of their local environ-
ments and communities.  
I.  FRACKING AND ITS CHANGING REGULATORY 
REGIME   
This Part first describes the increased use of fracking and 
its impacts on the environment and on communities. This Part 
then discusses the changing regulatory regime governing 
fracking and introduces local governments’ efforts to regain 
control over fracking and state efforts to preempt them.  
A. THE IMPACTS OF FRACKING ON LOCAL COMMUNITIES 
Hydraulic fracturing is not a new technique; in fact, it was 
first commercialized in 1949.20 The recent growth in natural 
gas production is due to advances in both horizontal drilling 
and hydraulic fracturing.21 These factors have opened up access 
to unconventional deposits of shale gas, which were previously 
uneconomical to produce.22 Across the country, the number of 
natural gas wells has increased from just over 300,000 to over 
500,000 in ten years—an increase twice the rate of the previous 
decade.23
 
 20. Crocker v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 419 P.2d 265, 271 (Okla. 1965).  
 The United States Energy Information Administra-
tion projects an increase of approximately 29% in natural gas 
 21. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, MODERN SHALE GAS DEVELOPMENT IN THE 
UNITED STATES: A PRIMER 9 (2009), available at http://www.netl.doe.gov/ 
technologies/oil-gas/publications/EPreports/Shale_Gas_Primer_2009.pdf [here-
inafter DOE, MODERN SHALE GAS] (“[S]hale gas production [is also] economi-
cally viable [because of] . . . rapid increases in natural gas prices in the last 
several years as a result of significant supply and demand pressures.”). 
 22. Id. at 7.  
 23. U.S. Natural Gas Number of Gas and Gas Condensate Wells, U.S. EN-
ERGY INFO. ADMIN., available at http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/na1170_nus_ 
8a.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2013). 
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production between 2010 and 2035, almost entirely due to shale 
gas.24 And by 2035, half of the United States’ energy will come 
from natural gas.25 Large shale deposits exist across the United 
States, but the largest is the Marcellus Shale, which lies under 
West Virginia, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and New York.26 Other de-
posits include the Barnett Shale in Texas, the Fayetteville 
Shale in Arkansas, the Woodford Shale in Oklahoma, and the 
Haynesville Shale in Arkansas, Texas, and Louisiana, and the 
Bakken Shale in North Dakota.27
As fracking spreads across the country, public concern con-
tinues to grow. Early failures of the cement casing in wells 
caused houses to explode because of methane leaks
  
28 and con-
taminated rivers and drinking wells.29 The infamous documen-
tary film Gasland shows homeowners living near natural gas 
wells lighting a match and setting their tap water on fire—a 
result of increased levels of methane and other toxic chemicals 
in the water supply.30 These stories sparked the anti-fracking 
movement, leading to waves of protest, celebrity attention, and 
criticism of the industry.31
While these situations draw attention and alarm, the less 
dramatic but equally pervasive effect of fracking is the way in-
dustrial activity transforms the landscape and character of 
communities in both rural and urban areas.
  
32
 
 24. EIA, What Is Shale Gas?, supra note 
 In many cases, 
4.  
 25. Inman, supra note 1. 
 26. Shaun A. Goho, Municipalities and Hydraulic Fracturing: Trends in 
State Preemption, 64 PLAN. & ENVTL. L., July 2012, at 3.  
 27. See id.; DOE, MODERN SHALE GAS, supra note 21, at 13.  
 28. OHIO DEP’T OF NATURAL RES., REPORT ON INVESTIGATION OF THE 
NATURAL GAS INVASION OF AQUIFERS IN BAINBRIDGE TOWNSHIP OF GEAUGA 
COUNTY, OHIO 46 (2008), available at http://www.dnr.state.oh.us/Portals/11/ 
bainbridge/report.pdf (noting one such example).  
 29. See, e.g., Abrahm Lustgarten, Officials in Three States Pin Water Woes 
on Gas Drilling, PROPUBLICA (Apr. 26, 2009, 7:00 AM), http://www 
.propublica.org/article/officials-in-three-states-pin-water-woes-on-gas-drilling 
-426. 
 30. See ‘Gasland’ Documentary Shows Water that Burns, Toxic Effects of 
Natural Gas Drilling, HUFFINGTON POST (May 25, 2011, 5:50 PM), http://www 
.huffingtonpost.com/2010/06/21/gasland-documentary-shows_n_619840.html. 
 31. See, e.g., Mark Jaffe, Anti-Fracking Rally Draws Celebrities to Civic 
Center Park, DENVER POST, Oct. 24, 2012, http://www.denverpost.com/ 
commented/ci_21840312?source=commented- (describing a “Frack Free Colo-
rado” rally and concert in Colorado that drew 200 people, including musicians, 
actors, and activists).  
 32. See Spence, supra note 2, at 480–81 (“From the beginning of site prep-
aration through the completion of the fracking job, fracking is an industrial 
process, [with all] the air quality, water quality, . . . visual, . . . noise . . . and 
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communities are encountering large-scale industrial fossil fuel 
production for the first time, and as remote natural gas re-
sources are exhausted, fracking continues to push closer to res-
idential areas.33 These factors have led to legal battles between 
state and local governments over who has the power to control 
fracking.34
Fracking takes place on a concrete well pad, which is a 
flattened piece of property requiring a minimum of five acres of 
land.
 
35 Operating rigs can run twenty-four hours a day, and the 
crew often lives on site.36 Other equipment includes tanks or 
pits for liquid storage, piping, and vertical structures, which 
have a visual impact on the landscape.37 The fracking process 
itself can shake the ground,38 and most of the natural gas pro-
cessing also occurs on site, requiring “compressor stations, pro-
cessing plants, and transmission lines.”39 Fracking also in-
cludes an enormous increase in truck traffic to haul in 
equipment and millions of gallons of the water and chemical 
mixture used to fracture the shale.40 This truck traffic contrib-
utes to air pollution, road stress, and noise impacts, particular-
ly in small towns unused to industrial activity.41
In addition to impacting the nature and character of com-
munities, fracking has significant environmental consequences. 
Each well may use around five million gallons of water,
  
42 which 
raises concerns about drawdown from groundwater sources, 
particularly in the Southwest where water is scarce.43
 
other [impacts we associate with] industrialization.”). 
 Commu-
 33. See Goho, supra note 26, at 4.  
 34. See, e.g., Mireya Navarro, Court Rejects a Ban on Local Fracking Lim-
its, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2012, http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/07/26/court 
-rejects-a-ban-on-local-fracking-limits/ (describing a lawsuit in Pennsylvania 
which struck down a state law forbidding municipalities to limit where natu-
ral gas drilling can take place).  
 35. See John M. Smith, The Prodigal Son Returns: Oil and Gas Drillers 
Return to Pennsylvania with a Vengeance—Are Municipalities Prepared?, 49 
DUQ. L. REV. 1, 6 (2011).  
 36. See id. 
 37. Spence, supra note 2, at 444.  
 38. See id. at 488. 
 39. Smith, supra note 35, at 7.  
 40. See id. at 21; Spence, supra note 2, at 444.  
 41. See Smith, supra note 35, at 21.  
 42. Id. at 6.  
 43. See Hannah Wiseman, Untested Waters: The Rise of Hydraulic Frac-
turing in Oil and Gas Production and the Need to Revisit Regulation, 20 
FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 115, 188 (2009) (explaining why states should con-
sider all “cradle to grave” effects of fracking, including effects on groundwa-
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nities are also concerned about what happens with the millions 
of gallons of “flowback”—the mixture of water, toxic or carcino-
genic chemicals, and sometimes radioactive material, which re-
turns to the surface after the shale is fractured.44 The industry 
often stores this concoction at the well site in open pits or tanks 
before disposing of it.45 Sometimes the mixture is discharged di-
rectly into surface waters or through a wastewater treatment 
facility, but often, it is injected back into an underground for-
mation, which can cause earthquakes.46
B. AN INTRODUCTION TO LOCAL ZONING POWER AND STATE 
PREEMPTION 
 State and local gov-
ernments are grappling with how to address these and other 
environmental effects. 
Because there is no federal regulation of fracking, the bat-
tle over regulatory control is occurring at the state and local 
level.47
1. The Local Zoning Power 
 The tension lies between local governments’ zoning 
power and the right of states to preempt local control. This Sec-
tion focuses on the scope of the zoning power and state preemp-
tion and the benefits and limitations of local control versus 
state control. 
Traditionally, local governments could control fracking 
through the zoning power,48 which serves to promote orderly 
use and development of land.49 States empower municipalities 
to enact comprehensive plans and zoning ordinances, through 
which the municipality can divide land geographically based on 
zones and then designate particular activities or “uses” allowed 
within each zone.50
 
ter). 
 Permitted uses are allowed by right, mean-
 44. See Michelle L. Kennedy, The Exercise of Local Control Over Gas Ex-
traction, 22 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 375, 376–77 (2011). But see Gov. John 
Hickenlooper Tells Senate Committee He Drank Fracking Fluid, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Feb. 13, 2013, 6:49 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/13/gov 
-john-hickenlooper-drank-fracking-fluid-hydraulic-fracturing_n_2674453.html 
(describing how the Governor of Colorado claimed he drank the fluid used by 
Halliburton in the fracking process to show his support for hydraulic fractur-
ing).  
 45. See Kennedy, supra note 44, at 377.  
 46. See Spence, supra note 2, at 487–88.  
 47. See id. at 447. 
 48. Smith, supra note 35, at 23–24. 
 49. Id. at 24.  
 50. Id.  
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ing they can occur without being reviewed by the local govern-
ment.51 A conditional use, on the other hand, usually involves 
an application process and public hearings before it is ap-
proved, and these uses can be regulated by the local govern-
ment to protect “the health, safety, and welfare of the commu-
nity.”52
Local governments across the country have used zoning or-
dinances to ban, restrict, and regulate fracking. Many munici-
palities have prohibited fracking, either temporarily or perma-
nently.
 
53 Others exercise the more traditional form of zoning 
power by regulating where fracking can occur, such as by re-
quiring that wells be drilled a certain distance away from resi-
dential areas or fragile natural resources.54 Finally, some mu-
nicipalities regulate how fracking occurs by imposing permit 
requirements and impact fees for road construction and 
maintenance, restricting truck traffic, and regulating noise, 
odors, pollution, visual impacts, and water use and disposal.55
2. State Preemption 
  
Municipalities, however, are creations of the state, and ul-
timately have only as much authority as a state gives them 
through the state constitution or statutes.56 States can preempt 
local control over an activity through express preemption, con-
flict preemption, or field preemption.57 Express preemption is 
an explicit limitation on local control of an activity.58 Conflict 
preemption arises when a court determines an ordinance is su-
perseded because it creates a conflict with a specific part of 
state law.59
 
 51. Id. 
 Field preemption occurs when state regulations are 
 52. Id. at 24–25.  
 53. See Local Actions, supra note 8.  
 54. See, e.g., ARLINGTON, TEX., GAS DRILLING & PROD. ORDINANCES 
§ 7.01(B) (2011), available at http://www.arlingtontx.gov/citysecretary/pdf/ 
codeofordinances/GasDrilling-Chapter.pdf (prohibiting gas drilling within 600 
feet of a park or a protected use). 
 55. See, e.g., id. § 7.01(A); TOWNSHIP. OF JACKSON, PA., ORDINANCE 141 
§ 4(C) (2006), available at http://www.jacksontwppa.com/ 
masterordinanceindex.htm.  
 56. Goho, supra note 26, at 5.  
 57. Id.; cf. Jonathan Rosenbloom, New Day at the Pool: State Preemption, 
Common Pool Resources, and Non-Place Based Municipal Collaborations, 36 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 445, 451 (2012) (referring to express, conflict, and im-
plied preemption). 
 58. Goho, supra note 26, at 5. 
 59. Id. 
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so comprehensive that they occupy the field, leaving no room 
for local control.60 These questions of preemption are often fur-
ther complicated by the municipal home rule, a constitutional 
provision granting municipalities the ability to adopt ordinanc-
es regarding issues of local concern.61 All of the states in which 
fracking occurs, except Arkansas, have a municipal home 
rule.62 Courts are often the ultimate deciders of the type and 
scope of state preemption.63
Many states have sought to preempt local control over 
fracking to create a more consistent regulatory structure and 
incentivize natural resource development. The states where 
fracking occurs have adopted different approaches to preemp-
tion. For example, Pennsylvania
  
64 and New York65 have adopt-
ed statutes which purport to supersede local regulation of oil 
and gas development, but while Pennsylvania has seen an ex-
plosion of fracking, New York recently extended its statewide 
moratorium on fracking to conduct further study of the process 
and its effects.66 Colorado on the other hand, generally follows a 
conflict preemption approach.67
3. The Benefits and Limitations of Preemption 
 
From a policy point of view, there are benefits and limita-
tions to both state control and local control. The primary bene-
fit of state preemption is that uniform regulation creates a 
more predictable and stable environment for the private sec-
 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See infra Part I.C for a discussion of court decisions delineating the 
balance of power between state and local governments. 
 64. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3301–3309 (2013), available at http://www.legis 
.state.pa.us/WU01/LI/LI/CT/PDF/58/58.PDF. But see supra note 13 (noting re-
cent finding by a Pennsylvania court that section 3304 is unconstitutional). 
 65. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 23-0303(2) (Consol. 2013), available at 
http://public.leginfo.state.ny.us/menuf.cgi. 
 66. See Under Massive Pressure, New York Extends Fracking Moratorium, 
SUSTAINABLEBUSINESS.COM (Oct. 3, 2012), http://www.sustainablebusiness 
.com/index.cfm/go/news.display/id/24133 [hereinafter Under Massive Pres-
sure]. 
 67. See Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, La Plata Cnty. v. Bowen/Edwards Assocs., 
830 P.2d 1045, 1055 (Colo. 1992) (en banc) (“The purpose of the preemption 
doctrine is to establish a priority between potentially conflicting laws enacted 
by various levels of government.”); Goho, supra note 26, at 7 (stating that Col-
orado courts ask whether an “operational conflict” exists between the munici-
pal ordinance and state regulations, and that the Colorado Supreme Court has 
held that municipal bans on oil and gas drilling are preempted per se).  
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tor.68 It does this by eliminating the patchwork of regulations 
and zoning laws often created when local governments regulate 
industry themselves.69
When creating regulations, states can choose to set uni-
form minimum standards, uniform maximum standards, or 
both. Uniform minimum standards “may raise the bar by estab-
lishing a baseline of protection,”
  
70 which ensures all municipali-
ties have some regulations in place for an industry. It also can 
help prevent a “race to the bottom” which occurs when munici-
palities relax environmental standards to attract industry and 
business to their communities.71 Uniform maximum standards, 
on the other hand, which are commonly used in the context of 
fracking, set a regulatory ceiling and are created to provide a 
stable environment for industry to operate.72
Preemption is also useful when local governments do not 
have the personnel or financial ability to regulate the impacts 
of an industry. States generally have more resources with 
which they can create and enforce regulations.
 
73 Finally, not all 
local governments want to impose regulations on industrial ac-
tivity in their communities, especially when they reap the bene-
fits of the industry and the negative impacts are spread over a 
wider area.74 In these cases, states are better positioned to cre-
ate regulations to ensure that costs and benefits are shared.75
On the other hand, local governments are better positioned 
to tailor laws to address particularized harms.
  
76 Uniform envi-
ronmental laws and regulations are often inflexible and cannot 
address the context-specific impacts of activities like fracking.77
 
 68. See Weiland, Preemption Analysis, supra note 
 
When the impact of an industry is localized, decision-making 
15, at 242–43. 
 69. See id. at 276. 
 70. See id. at 242.  
 71. See id. 
 72. See id. 
 73. See Weiland, Preemption Implications, supra note 14, at 504 (describ-
ing how “federal laws displaced weak and under-enforced state and local laws” 
in the 1960s and 1970s). 
 74. See id. at 504–05 (postulating that centralized environmental protec-
tion may result in the coordination necessary to overcome negative externali-
ties). 
 75. See id. 
 76. See Annie Decker, Preemption Conflation: Dividing the Local from the 
State in Congressional Decision Making, 30 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 321, 355 
(2012).  
 77. See Weiland, Preemption Implications, supra note 14, at 505. 
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that is decentralized and participatory is often preferable to 
centralized decision making.78
Additionally, the process of local governance is often 
viewed as democracy at work.
  
79 Local governments are closer to 
the people and frequently more responsive to citizen concerns 
than state governments.80 In the face of preemption, local gov-
ernments have fewer avenues to respond to citizen’s concerns.81
Preemption can also force local governments to become 
“lobbyists, as opposed to lawmakers” because their only option 
is to advocate for change in the state regulations.
  
82 Often, local 
governments do not have this type of political power and cannot 
spare limited resources for lobbying.83
On a broader level, preemption limits the ability of local 
governments to create innovative responses to environmental 
concerns.
 
84 Communities often lead the country on environmen-
tal issues when they are able to experiment with approaches to 
land use and the protection of natural resources.85 Even more 
broadly, local governments have carefully guarded their right 
to determine what kind of communities they will live in and 
how their land is used.86 Preemption inhibits the ability of local 
communities to create and fulfill their own unique visions of 
how they will live.87
C. RESOLVING DISPUTES BETWEEN STATE AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENTS 
  
Disputes about the balance of power between state and lo-
cal governments over fracking are taking place across the coun-
try. Frequently, challenges to local ordinances come from natu-
ral gas companies, which generally prefer uniform state 
 
 78. See id. at 505–06. 
 79. See id. at 499. 
 80. See id. 
 81. See Weiland, Preemption Analysis, supra note 15, at 281. 
 82. See Weiland, Preemption Implications, supra note 14, at 500. 
 83. See id. at 498. 
 84. See Weiland, Preemption Analysis, supra note 15, at 280. 
 85. See Jerrold A. Long, Sustainability Starts Locally: Untying the Hands 
of Local Government to Create Sustainable Communities, 10 WYO. L. REV. 1, 
33 (2010). 
 86. Id. at 21. 
 87. See id. at 33–34 (“A western democracy of communities . . . is the nec-
essary precondition to the full application of our individual and collective in-
telligence and creativity to the task of creating a sustainable West.”).  
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regulation over fragmented local regulation.88 Litigation con-
cerning the scope of local authority has been particularly preva-
lent in Pennsylvania, New York, and Colorado.89 These ongoing 
disputes have had mixed results for the industry and local gov-
ernments, with some courts upholding ordinances regulating 
where fracking occurs, but striking down ordinances regulating 
how fracking occurs.90 Some courts, particularly in states such 
as Colorado where conflict preemption prevails, will analyze 
each aspect of local regulations to determine whether they con-
flict with state law.91 In other states, local governments have no 
authority to regulate gas drilling.92 Finally, total bans on 
fracking by municipalities have been upheld in some states93 
but prohibited in others.94
In addition to pursuing litigation, some state and local gov-
ernments have tried to cooperate in the regulation of fracking. 
The governor of Colorado created a task force to identify areas 
of local concern and to involve local governments more fully in 
the regulatory process.
  
95 In the northeast, the Delaware River 
Basin Commission, a multi-state organization with statutory 
power to protect water resources, has sought to expand its role 
to regulate fracking.96
 
 88. See Goho, supra note 
 These attempts have received mixed re-
26, at 5.  
 89. Id. at 5–8. 
 90. See Anschutz Exploration Corp. v. Town of Dryden, 940 N.Y.S.2d 458, 
465 (Sup. Ct. 2012) (upholding a ban on fracking under the local zoning pow-
er), aff’d sub nom. Norse Energy Corp. USA v. Town of Dryden, 964 N.Y.S.2d 
714 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013), leave to appeal granted, No. 2013-604, 2013 WL 
4562930 (N.Y. Aug. 29, 2013); Cooperstown Holstein Corp. v. Town of Mid-
dlefield, 943 N.Y.S.2d 722, 723 (Sup. Ct. 2012) (same); Huntley & Huntley, 
Inc. v. Borough Council of Oakmont, 964 A.2d 855, 863 (Pa. 2009) (upholding 
restriction on where fracking occurs); Range Res.-Appalachia LLC v. Salem 
Twp., 964 A.2d 869, 876 (Pa. 2009) (striking down local ordinance that at-
tempted to regulate how fracking occurs). 
 91. See Town of Frederick v. N. Am. Res. Co., 60 P.3d 758, 765 (Colo. Ct. 
App. 2002) (holding that state law did not preempt the entirety of a municipal 
oil and gas drilling ordinance, but that the ordinance’s setback, noise abate-
ment, and visual impact provisions were preempted). 
 92. See N.E. Natural Energy, LLC v. Morgantown, W.V., No. 11-C-411, 
slip op. at 10 (Monongalia Cnty. Cir. Ct. Aug. 12, 2011) (holding that the W. 
VA. CODE § 22-1-1 et seq. (1994) gives exclusive control of the area of oil and 
gas development to the West Virginia Department of Environmental Protec-
tion). 
 93. See Anschutz Exploration Corp., 940 N.Y.S.2d at 471. 
 94. See Voss v. Lundvall Bros., 830 P.2d 1061, 1068 (Colo. 1992). 
 95. See Press Release, Hickenlooper, supra note 18. 
 96. See Natural Gas Drilling Index Page, DEL. RIVER BASIN COMM’N, 
http://www.nj.gov/drbc/programs/natural/ (last modified July 18, 2013). 
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views. In Colorado, local governments are concerned that the 
value of the task force is minimal and has neither increased lo-
cal government power over fracking nor prevented conflict be-
tween state and local governments.97 Questions have risen re-
garding the Delaware River Basin Commission’s actual 
effectiveness and its appropriate scope of authority over 
fracking.98
II.  THE CURRENT REGULATORY REGIME IS FAILING TO 
PROTECT LOCAL GOVERNMENT CONTROL OVER 
FRACKING   
 On the whole, whether conflict or cooperation has 
prevailed, the result is that local governments are experiencing 
diminished control over fracking in their communities. 
This Part analyzes how Pennsylvania, New York, Colorado, 
and the Delaware River Basin Commission approach fracking 
regulations and their effect on local governments’ control over 
fracking. Part A evaluates the outcome of legal disputes over 
fracking in Pennsylvania and New York. Part B explores the 
effectiveness of Colorado’s efforts to cooperate with local gov-
ernments to create fracking regulations and the Delaware Riv-
er Basin Commission’s attempt to exert regional control over 
the regulation of fracking.  
A. CONFLICTS OVER THE REGULATION OF FRACKING  
Fracking is causing intense conflict between local govern-
ments, the state, and the oil and gas industry over where regu-
latory power should reside. Pennsylvania and New York are 
two states where litigation over preemption and regulatory con-
trol is prevalent. These states have taken similar approaches to 
preemption and both result in diminished local control over 
fracking.  
1. Express Preemption in Pennsylvania  
The Marcellus Shale, lying beneath New York, Pennsylva-
nia, West Virginia, and Ohio, is one of the nation’s largest shale 
formations.99
 
 97. See, e.g., Berwyn, supra note 
 Of these states, Pennsylvania has seen the largest 
19 (showing that Colorado task force has 
not prevented further disputes regarding local government control). 
 98. See Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman, Hybrid Energy Govern-
ance, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 26), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2147860 [hereinafter Osofsky & Wiseman, Hybrid 
Energy]. 
 99. Elisabeth N. Radow, Citizen David Tames Gas Goliaths on the Marcel-
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expansion of fracking,100
Pennsylvania takes an express preemption approach to 
drilling.
 and consequently, the greatest number 
of disputes regarding who has the power to control it.  
101 Even before its most recent overhaul, the Oil and 
Gas Act of Pennsylvania was written to preempt almost all lo-
cal control over oil and gas drilling.102 Local governments chal-
lenged the law, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued a 
pair of decisions determining the limits of state preemption and 
the boundaries of the local zoning power.103 In the first case, the 
court decided that the location of a natural gas well was not a 
feature of the operation regulated by the Act,104 meaning that 
local governments retained the power to impose siting re-
quirements on wells. The court also decided that the local regu-
lation did not “accomplish the same purposes” as the Act, be-
cause although some of the goals of the state and local 
regulations were the same, the court found that the primary 
goal of the local regulations was to “preserv[e] the character of 
residential neighborhoods.”105
In the second case, however, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court struck down an ordinance that attempted to regulate 
surface and land development associated with oil and gas drill-
ing.
  
106
 
lus Shale Stage: Citizen Action as a Form of Dispute Prevention in the Internet 
Age, 12 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 373, 374 (2011).  
 The court found that the ordinance attempted to create a 
 100. U.S. Crude Oil and Natural Gas Proved Reserves, U.S. ENERGY INFO. 
ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/naturalgas/crudeoilreserves/ (last updated Aug. 1, 
2013). 
 101. See Huntley & Huntley, Inc. v. Borough Council of Oakmont, 964 A.2d 
855, 863 (Pa. 2009) (“As applied presently, Section 602 of the Oil and Gas Act 
contains express preemption language. That language totally preempts local 
regulation of oil and gas development except with regard to municipal ordi-
nances adopted pursuant to the MPC as well as the Flood Plain Management 
Act.”).  
 102. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3302 (2013), available at http://www.legis.state 
.pa.us/WU01/LI/LI/CT/PDF/58/58.PDF (formerly 58 PA. STAT. ANN. § 601.602 
(1996)). 
 103. See Goho, supra note 26, at 6. 
 104. Huntley & Huntley, 964 A.2d at 863–64 (“[A]lthough . . . the Act places 
some restrictions on the siting of wells-most notably, setback requirements 
designed to prevent damage to existing water wells, buildings and bodies of 
water, as well as measures intended to protect attributes of Pennsylvania’s 
landscape such as parks, forests, gamelands, scenic rivers, natural landmarks, 
and historical and archeological sites, it does not automatically follow that the 
placement of a natural gas well at a certain location is a feature of its opera-
tion.”) (citations omitted).  
 105. Id. at 865.  
 106. Range Res.-Appalachia, LLC v. Salem Twp., 694 A.2d 869, 877 (Pa. 
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“comprehensive regulatory scheme” and was therefore 
preempted by the Oil and Gas Act.107 The court specifically 
found that many of the regulations in the ordinance “substan-
tively overlap[ped]” with state regulations because both estab-
lished permitting procedures, imposed bonding requirements, 
and regulated site restoration after drilling operations 
ceased.108
These two cases delineated the balance of regulatory power 
in Pennsylvania and left local governments with little control 
over fracking. In these decisions, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court adopted a “how versus where” distinction to determine 
which level of government has regulatory power.
 
109 In other 
words, local governments retain limited control over the loca-
tion of gas wells within their communities, but are preempted 
from regulating any aspect of the wells’ operation, even if the 
operations affect the community’s health, safety and welfare.110
However, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court also acknowl-
edged the importance of the local zoning power and the unique 
interests local governments have in the development of their 
land. In Huntley, for example, the court noted that local zoning 
regulations are important because they “deal with all potential 
land uses and generally incorporate an overall statement of 
community development objectives . . . .”
  
111 The court stated 
that the intent of the local ordinance was to establish “objec-
tives relating to the safety and welfare of its citizens, encourag-
ing the most appropriate use of land . . . conserving the value of 
property, minimizing overcrowding and traffic congestion, and 
providing adequate open spaces.”112 Zoning laws are designed to 
recognize the “unique expertise” of municipal governing bodies 
to determine how land is used and developed to protect the 
character of the community.113
 
2009) (“In view of the Ordinance’s focus solely on regulating oil and gas drill-
ing operations, together with the broad preemptive scope of [the Oil and Gas] 
Act with regard to such directed local regulations, . . . each of the oil and gas 
regulations challenged in Appellees’ complaint is preempted by the Oil and 
Gas Act and its associated administrative regulations.”). 
 Yet, despite these important ob-
 107. Id. at 875. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 873; see Goho, supra note 26, at 4–5.  
 110. See Goho, supra note 26, at 5–6.  
 111. Huntley & Huntley Inc. v. Borough Council of Oakmont, 964 A.2d 855, 
865 (Pa. 2009).  
 112. Id.  
 113. Id. at 866. 
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jectives, the Pennsylvania Oil and Gas Act and these court de-
cisions do not fully allow a local government to make decisions 
regarding land use, because they are preempted from imposing 
different or more stringent regulations on oil and gas develop-
ment and fracking. Preemption directly undermines the pur-
pose and importance of local zoning.  
The power of local governments was further diminished 
when the Pennsylvania legislature overhauled the Oil and Gas 
Act and replaced it with Act 13, which sought to preempt all lo-
cal regulation of oil and gas operations, including environmen-
tal laws and all zoning code provisions.114 Section 3304 of the 
Act required that every local ordinance allow for the “reasona-
ble development of oil and gas resources” and that oil and gas 
operations be “a permitted use in all zoning districts.”115 Per-
mitted uses are allowed as a matter of right, so Act 13 gave lo-
cal governments no say as to how or where fracking took 
place.116
The subsequent legal battle brought together a large coali-
tion of plaintiffs, including municipalities, land owners, envi-
ronmentalists and citizen groups.
 
117 The plaintiffs challenged 
the constitutionality of Act 13, and specifically § 3304, arguing 
in part that it forced municipalities to enact zoning ordinances 
allowing mining and gas operations in all zoning districts re-
gardless of the municipalities’ comprehensive plan and devel-
opment structure.118 The court, consistent with the “how versus 
where” distinction,119
 
 114. See Nancy D. Perkins, The Fracturing of Place: The Regulation of 
Marcellus Shale Development and the Subordination of Local Experience, 23 
FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 44, 45–47 (2012). 
 found that “§ 3304 violat[ed] substantive 
due process because it allows incompatible uses in zoning dis-
tricts and does not protect the interests of neighboring property 
owners from harm, alters the character of the neighborhood, 
 115. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3304(a), (b)(5) (2013), available at http://www 
.legis.state.pa.us/WU01/LI/LI/CT/PDF/58/58.PDF (emphasis added). 
 116. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 117. See, e.g., Janice Crompton, Municipal Officials Decry State Control of 
Shale Drilling, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Dec. 14, 2011, http://old.post 
-gazette.com/pg/11348/1196672-455-0.stm?cmpid=news.xml (quoting state 
Representative Jess White as saying, “[e]liminating or severely limiting local 
zoning of Marcellus Shale is indefensible corporate welfare on the backs of the 
taxpayers of Pennsylvania”).  
 118. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 52 A.3d 463, 480–81 (Pa. Commw. 
Ct. 2012). 
 119. Range Res.-Appalachia, LLC v. Salem Twp., 964 A.2d 869, 873 (Pa. 
2009) (describing the “how versus where” distinction). 
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and makes irrational classifications.”120 The court permanently 
enjoined the Commonwealth from enforcing the provisions of   
§ 3304.121
The State appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania, which has yet to rule.
 
122
The negative reactions of communities are substantiated 
by analysis which suggests that although the Oil and Gas Act 
contains environmental regulations, they do not allow for 
meaningful input from citizens.
 Given the precedent, it 
seems likely that the state supreme court will at least uphold 
the ruling regarding § 3304 of Act 13. While Pennsylvania 
courts have protected some local control over fracking and oil 
and gas development, the Pennsylvania legislature has shown 
an interest in the unfettered development of natural gas in the 
state. Under the doctrine of state preemption, the courts are 
unable to fully prevent these actions, despite recognizing the 
importance of the local zoning power. The strong reaction of lo-
cal governments to these attempts to preempt their control in-
dicates that these communities do not believe their interests 
are being protected by the state or the courts.  
123 For instance, § 3212.1 of the 
Oil and Gas Act allows municipalities to submit comments to 
the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection 
(DEP) when gas wells are proposed within their boundaries.124 
However, the DEP’s review of the comments is restricted to 
matters related only to the location of the well, and the DEP is 
not required to actually consider the comments.125 In addition, 
there is no mechanism through which municipalities can ap-
peal DEP decisions.126
 
 120. Robinson Twp., 52 A.3d at 485. 
  
 121. Id.  
 122. See, e.g., Paul J. Gough, Corbett Appeals Ruling on Act 13 Zoning, 
PITTSBURGH BUS. TIMES, Jul. 27, 2012, http://www.bizjournals.com/pittsburgh/ 
blog/energy/2012/07/corbett-appeals-ruling-on-act-13-zoning.html.  
 123. See generally 14 Reasons to Oppose HB 1950 and SB 1100, 
MARCELLUS OUTREACH BUTLER, http://www.marcellusoutreachbutler.org/14 
-reasons-to-oppose-hb-1950-and-sb1100.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2013). 
 124. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3212.1(a) (2013), available at http://www.legis 
.state.pa.us/WU01/LI/LI/CT/PDF/58/58.PDF. 
 125. Id. § 3212.1(b) (“Comments and responses under subsections (a) and 
(a.1) may be considered by the department in accordance with section 3215(d) 
(relating to well location restrictions).”). 
 126. Id. § 3215(d) (“Notwithstanding any other law, no municipality or 
storage operator shall have a right of appeal or other form of review from the 
department’s decision.”); see also Perkins, supra note 114, at 52–53 (“The 
comment process is limited, however, because DEP’s review is restricted to 
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The regulations themselves are not stringent enough to 
protect communities and the environment. PennFuture, an en-
vironmental group in Pennsylvania called the legislation a 
“weak” and “squandered” opportunity.127 The House Minority 
Leader Frank Dermody opined that the legislation “does not 
raise the revenues necessary to make sure the taxpayers are 
not left holding the bag” with regard to clean-up.128 In addition, 
a part of the act which went into effect in September 2012 gives 
authority to DEP administrators, instead of local experts, to 
decide whether and when residential water users should re-
ceive letters regarding water quality issues in their neighbor-
hoods, meaning that the public may not receive any notification 
if there are contaminants in their water supply.129 Environmen-
tal groups such as the Sierra Club, Earthjustice, Clean Water 
Action, and the Delaware Riverkeeper Network asked the gov-
ernor to reverse the change so that the public receives infor-
mation about its water quality immediately.130
Ultimately, the citizens of Pennsylvania have seen a rapid 
expansion of an industry that has a significant impact on land 
use and is not being appropriately regulated by the state gov-
ernment. While local governments have, thanks to the courts 
retained minimal power over where fracking can take place in 
their communities, they cannot control the process of fracking 
to reduce its impacts on the community and the environment. 
 
2. A Cautionary Tale: Preemption and the Fracking 
Moratorium in New York 
Unlike Pennsylvania, New York has not experienced a 
boom in natural gas production because the state has a morato-
rium on fracking.131
 
matters related to well location, the consideration of comments is not manda-
tory and municipalities cannot appeal DEP permit decisions.”). 
 New York has taken a very cautious ap-
proach to fracking to ensure it is carried out in a way that is 
consistent with protecting the environment and communities.  
 127. Laura Olson, Shale Bill Heads to Governor, PITTSBURGH POST-
GAZETTE, Feb. 9, 2012, http://www.post-gazette.com/stories/local/state/shale 
-bill-heads-to-governor-215214/.  
 128. Id.  
 129. Kevin Begos, 14 Eco Groups Ask Pennsylvania to Change Drill/Water 
Policy, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 23, 2012, http://www.poconorecord.com/apps/ 
pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20121023/NEWS90/121029908/-1/news. 
 130. Id. 
 131. See, e.g., Under Massive Pressure, supra note 66. 
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In many ways, however, New York’s approach to preemp-
tion and local control mirrors Pennsylvania in that New York 
has taken an express preemption approach to regulation. New 
York’s Oil, Gas, and Solution Mining law states: “The provi-
sions of this article shall supersede all local laws or ordinances 
relating to the regulation of the oil, gas and solution mining in-
dustries.”132 The court battles in New York are also similar to 
those in Pennsylvania. Following Huntley and Range-Resources 
in Pennsylvania,133 New York courts considered similar cases 
regarding the scope of state preemption. In Anschutz Explora-
tion Corp. v. Town of Dryden, the court considered a zoning or-
dinance that banned all activities related to exploration, pro-
duction and storage of natural gas and oil.134 Anschutz 
Exploration Corporation sued the town, arguing that New York 
state law preempted the ordinance.135 The court held that be-
cause the “statute[] preempt[s] only local regulations ‘relating’ 
to the applicable industry . . . [it does] not expressly preempt 
local regulation of land use, but only regulations dealing with 
operations.”136 Similarly, in a case decided just days later, a 
court in a different county upheld a complete local ban on 
fracking: “[n]either the plain reading of the statutory language 
nor the [statute’s history] would lead this court to conclude that 
the phrase ‘this article shall supersede all local laws or ordi-
nances relating to the regulation of the oil, gas and solution 
mining industries’ . . . was intended by the Legislature to abro-
gate the constitutional and statutory authority vested in local 
municipalities to enact legislation affecting land use.”137
These cases show that, similar to Pennsylvania, New York 
adheres to a “how versus where” distinction regarding the 
scope of local zoning power.
  
138
 
 132. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 23-0303(2) (Consol. 2013), available at 
http://public.leginfo.state.ny.us/menuf.cgi. 
 However, New York goes further 
than Pennsylvania by recognizing that a complete ban on 
 133. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 134. Anschutz Exploration Corp. v. Town of Dryden, 940 N.Y.S.2d 458, 461 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012), aff’d sub nom. Norse Energy Corp. USA v. Town of Dry-
den, 964 N.Y.S.2d 714 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013), leave to appeal granted, No. 
2013-604, 2013 WL 4562930 (N.Y. Aug. 29, 2013).  
 135. Id. at 461.  
 136. Id. at 467 (emphasis added). 
 137. Cooperstown Holstein Corp. v. Town of Middlefield, 943 N.Y.S.2d 722, 
728 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012), aff’d, 964 N.Y.S.2d 431 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013). 
 138. Id. at 729 (“The state maintains control over the ‘how’ of such proce-
dures while the municipalities maintain control over the ‘where’ of such explo-
ration.”).  
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fracking is considered a regulation of the “where” of fracking. 
New York, therefore, has afforded greater protection to munici-
palities that want to completely exclude fracking from their 
communities. But, the law leaves no avenue for local govern-
ments that want to allow fracking to impose regulations on op-
erations tailored to the concerns of the community.  
The court in Anschutz also left open the possibility that fu-
ture regulations could further prevent local control: “In the ab-
sence of a clear expression of legislative intent to preempt local 
control over land use, the statute could not be read as preempt-
ing local zoning authority.”139 In addition, although this case 
was upheld on appeal, its fate now rests in the hands of the 
highest court in New York, which granted leave to appeal in 
August of 2013.140
On the political front in New York, citizen groups have 
been effective in pressuring the government to more closely 
study the effects of fracking. In September of 2012, Governor 
Cuomo’s administration announced that New York must review 
potential health effects of fracking.
 Finally, because there is currently a 
statewide moratorium on fracking, the ultimate validity of local 
ordinances regulating or banning fracking as well as the 
strength of final statewide environmental protections are still 
in flux.  
141 The administration made 
this decision even though the state had been studying fracking 
for the previous four years, which culminated in an extensive 
Environmental Impact Statement documenting the impacts of 
fracking.142 However, the 80,000 public comments sent to the 
commissioner of the State Department of Environmental Con-
servation raised numerous concerns about public health and 
called for either a permanent ban or further study.143
 
 139. Anschutz, 940 N.Y.S.2d at 466–67. 
 Many 
comments called for an independent study of the health and 
environmental effects, and although the state has rejected that 
idea, it appears open to the possibility of receiving input from 
 140. Norse Energy Corp. USA v. Town of Dryden, No. 2013-604, 2013 WL 
4562930, at *1 (N.Y. Aug. 29, 2013).  
 141. See, e.g., Mireya Navarro, New York State Plans Health Review as It 
Weighs Gas Drilling, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2012/09/21/nyregion/new-york-states-decision-on-hydrofracking-will-await 
-health-review.html?_r=0.  
 142. See N.Y. DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, REVISED DRAFT SGEIS ON 
THE OIL, GAS AND SOLUTION MINING REGULATORY PROGRAM (2011), available 
at http://www.dec.ny.gov/energy/75370.html. 
 143. See Navarro, supra note 141.  
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outside experts.144 While this shows the importance and poten-
tial effectiveness of citizen action, the ultimate outcome of 
fracking regulations and preemption of local zoning laws re-
mains unclear. Under the current law, municipalities can im-
pose local bans on fracking but the state statute preempts the 
regulation of fracking operations by local governments.145
B. ATTEMPTS AT COOPERATION IN THE REGULATION OF 
FRACKING 
 
While Pennsylvania and New York follow an express 
preemption approach to fracking, some attempts at cooperation 
have occurred elsewhere. This Section will describe the differ-
ent attempts at cooperation made by Colorado and by the Del-
aware River Basin Commission. 
1. The Tension Between Conflict and Cooperation in Colorado 
Colorado presents a particularly interesting example of the 
battle for control over fracking and oil and gas development. In 
Colorado, the Oil and Gas Conservation Commission (Colorado 
Commission) has express authority over oil and gas develop-
ment.146 Colorado courts look to whether there is an “operation-
al conflict” between zoning ordinances and state regulations.147 
This involves a detailed factual investigation into whether local 
regulations “conflict with the achievement of the state inter-
est.”148
The battle over control of oil and gas development has a 
decades-old history in Colorado, beginning in the 1980s when 
drilling moved closer to populated areas.
  
149 For example, in 
Town of Frederick v. North American Resources Co., the court 
used a conflict preemption approach and determined that local 
governments could not impose stricter technical or safety condi-
tions on wells than state regulations.150
 
 144. See id. 
 At the same time, how-
 145. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 23-0303(2) (Consol. 2013), available at 
http://public.leginfo.state.ny.us/menuf.cgi. 
 146. See Angela Neese, Comment, The Battle Between the Colorado Oil and 
Gas Conservation Commission and Local Governments: A Call for a New and 
Comprehensive Approach, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 561, 565 (2005).  
 147. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, La Plata Cnty. v. Bowen/Edwards Assocs., 830 
P.2d 1045, 1059 (Colo. 1992).  
 148. Town of Frederick v. N. Am. Res. Co., 60 P.3d 758, 761 (Colo. 2002) 
(quoting Bowen/Edwards, 830 P.2d at 1059). 
 149. See Neese, supra note 146, at 566. 
 150. Town of Frederick, 60 P.3d at 765.  
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ever, the court upheld the town’s ability to issue its own per-
mits for oil and gas drilling if the conditions did not conflict 
with state regulations.151
However, unlike New York,
  
152 the Colorado Supreme Court 
has established a per se rule that municipal bans on oil and gas 
development are impermissible. In Voss v. Lundvall Brothers, 
the court considered four factors to determine whether a state 
regulatory scheme preempted local regulation: “[1] whether 
there is a need for statewide uniformity of regulation; [2] 
whether the municipal regulation has an extraterritorial im-
pact; [3] whether the subject matter is one traditionally gov-
erned by state or local government; and [4] whether the Colo-
rado Constitution specifically commits the particular matter to 
state or local regulation.”153 In this case, the court found that 
the need for statewide uniformity of regulation of oil and gas 
development and production weighed in favor of eliminating 
the right of communities to ban fracking and drilling.154 The 
court determined that local bans would conflict with the state’s 
interest in the “efficient and fair development and production of 
oil and gas resources.”155
Colorado has therefore taken a conflict approach to deter-
mining when local regulation of oil and gas development is and 
is not permitted. Colorado courts have also come to the now 
familiar result that local governments are preempted from reg-
ulating problematic aspects of fracking operations and they are 
not able to impose complete bans on fracking. Where Colorado 
differs from other state, however, is the state government tried 
to take a more cooperative approach to regulation.  
 
In February of 2012, Governor Hickenlooper of Colorado 
created the Oil and Gas Task Force to resolve fracking-related 
issues through a cooperative approach, with the goal of avoid-
ing litigation and new legislation.156
 
 151. Id. at 763.  
 Some important aspects of 
the task force include: encouraging local governments to name 
a Local Government Designee to participate in the Colorado Oil 
and Gas Conservation Commission program; informing Design-
ees of the opportunity to request an additional ten days to re-
 152. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing how New York courts have upheld 
complete local bans on fracking). 
 153. Voss v. Lundvall Bros., 830 P.2d 1061, 1067 (Colo. 1992).  
 154. Id.  
 155. Id.  
 156. See Press Release, Hickenlooper, supra note 18. 
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view permits; providing for mutual understanding by promul-
gating accurate information and identifying development im-
pacts; promoting technical training of Designees; and providing 
general education to communities.157
The recommendations that ultimately emerged from the 
task force, however, neither mention any possibilities for new 
regulation nor do they actually give local governments much 
say in the process of permitting and regulating wells.
  
158 The Lo-
cal Government Designee program through the Colorado Com-
mission only gives the Designee the opportunity to engage in 
consultation with the operator of an oil and gas well, requires 
that they be given notice of an impending permit, and allows 
them to file complaints.159 There do not appear to be any oppor-
tunities for the Designee to actually influence the regulation of 
fracking operations in their community.160
Furthermore, the structure of the Colorado Commission 
calls into question its ability and commitment to meaningfully 
engage local government in the regulation of oil and gas devel-
opment. Historically, the board of the Colorado Commission 
was composed entirely of industry representatives.
  
161 Under the 
1994 amendments, the board composition changed slightly, re-
quiring two out of the seven seats on the board to be held by 
non-industry members who are experienced in agriculture, land 
reclamation, environmental protection, or soil conservation.162 
Further amendments in 2007 added additional requirements 
for board members, to ensure that at least one representative 
had experience in every one of these areas.163
 
 157. See id.  
 However, the 
amendments also required that three members have substan-
tial experience in the oil and gas industry and three members 
have a college degree in petroleum geology or petroleum engi-
 158. See id. (listing the Task Force’s recommendations). 
 159. See Surface Owner/LGD Involvement in COGCC Processes, COLO. OIL 
& GAS CONSERVATION COMM’N, http://www.cogcc.state.co.us/ (select “General” 
tab; then follow “Surface Owner/LGD Flowchart” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 
18, 2013). 
 160. See generally id. (presenting a rudimentary flow chart as the only in-
formation available regarding the Local Government Designee Program on the 
Colorado Commission’s website).  
 161. See Neese, supra note 146, at 575–76.  
 162. See id. at 576 (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-104(2)(a) (2013), avail-
able at http://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/statutes.html. 
 163. COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-104 (2013), available at http://www.sos.state 
.co.us/pubs/elections/statutes.html. 
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neering.164 In addition, the 2007 amendments actually removed 
the requirement that two of the seats be held by non-industry 
members, and did not replace this provision with a new quota 
or requirement. It is entirely conceivable that the individuals 
with backgrounds in environmental issues could still have sig-
nificant ties to the industry, and even more likely that those 
with degrees or experience related to oil and gas are in some 
way beholden to the industry. This composition raises “fox 
guarding the hen house” concerns because the Colorado Com-
mission has the “power to make and enforce rules, regulations, 
and orders” and to “do whatever may reasonably be necessary 
to carry out the provisions of the Act.”165
Finally, the Task Force has thus far been unsuccessful in 
promoting cooperation, stemming conflict, or alleviating local 
concerns about fracking. For example, in July of 2012, the Col-
orado Commission and the Colorado State Attorney General’s 
Office sued the City of Longmont, claiming that the oil and gas 
regulations passed by the city “trespassed into areas meant to 
be governed by the state.”
  
166
Later that year, Longmont city residents voted to amend 
their city charter to ban fracking and the storage of fracking 
waste in their city.
  
167 Given the legal precedent in Colorado,168 it 
seems inevitable that this ban will be struck down.169 Even 
though the charter still allows other types of extraction, the 
fact that an estimated eighty to ninety percent of modern wells 
use fracking170
 
 164. Id. 
 means it will be relatively straightforward for a 
court to find that the ban on the use of fracking limits the effi-
cient development of resources.  
 165. Id. § 34-60-105(1). 
 166. See Scott Rochat, State Sues Longmont Over Oil and Gas Drilling 
Regulations, LONGMONT TIMES-CALL, July 30, 2012, http://www.timescall.com/ 
news/longmont-local-news/ci_21193961/colorado-files-lawsuit-against 
-longmont-oil-gas-drilling. 
 167. See Voters Approve Longmont Fracking Ban, THE DENVER POST, Nov. 
7, 2012, http://www.denverpost.com/dontmiss/ci_21948965/voters-approve 
-longmont-fracking-ban.  
 168. See supra notes 153–55 and accompanying text.  
 169. See Scott Rochat, With Longmont Fracking Ban Passed, Questions Lie 
Ahead, LONGMONT TIMES-CALL, Nov. 8, 2012, http://www.timescall.com/news/ 
ci_21960617/longmont-fracking-ban-passed-questions-lie-ahead (discussing 
attorney Rick Samson’s opinion that the ban likely will not stand a legal chal-
lenge in the courtroom). 
 170. See id. 
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Even if the Longmont ban ends up being merely symbolic, 
it emphasizes continued public resistance to fracking, and illus-
trates the remaining concerns about its effect on communities 
and the environment. Ultimately, the cooperative efforts in 
Colorado have not served their stated purpose of promoting co-
operation and stemming conflict between state and local gov-
ernments, and it is clear that local governments in Colorado 
remain inadequately involved in the regulation of fracking in 
their communities.  
2. A Regional Approach: Evaluating the Delaware River Basin 
Commission’s Efforts to Take Control over Fracking 
The Delaware River Basin Commission (DRBC) is a feder-
al-interstate government agency formed through a compact in 
1961 between the United States and Pennsylvania, New York, 
New Jersey, and Delaware.171 The DRBC’s members include the 
governors of the member states and the North Atlantic Division 
Engineer of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, who serves as 
the federal representative.172 The DRBC has legal authority 
over water-quality related issues in the Delaware River Ba-
sin.173 In 2010, it drafted regulations for natural gas develop-
ment.174 The concerns of the DRBC include how the amount of 
water used in fracking affects water resources, the release of 
pollutants into ground water from drilling operations, and the 
treatment and disposal of flowback, which contains chemicals 
and occasionally radioactive material, from fracking opera-
tions.175
The regulations would constrain the number and location 
of gas sites within the watershed, require surface and ground-
water monitoring, require sites to comply with setback re-
quirements, limit the quantity of water that may be withdrawn 
for fracking, impose mandatory waste disposal processes, and 
require water quality testing.
 
176
 
 171. See Natural Gas Drilling Index Page, DEL. RIVER BASIN COMM’N, 
http://www.state.nj.us/drbc/programs/natural/ (last modified July 18, 2013) 
(describing the DRBC’s history and involvement in natural gas drilling in the 
Northeast). 
 However, the DRBC defers to 
 172. See id. 
 173. See id. 
 174. See id. 
 175. See supra notes 43–48 and accompanying text. 
 176. See DEL. RIVER BASIN COMM’N, DRBC DRAFT NATURAL GAS DEVEL-
OPMENT REGULATIONS “AT-A-GLANCE” FACT SHEET (2010), available at http:// 
www.state.nj.us/drbc/library/documents/naturalgas-draftregs-factsheet.pdf. 
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the state for well construction and operation procedures.177 
These regulations were proposed in 2010, and revised in 2011, 
but have yet to be approved by the state members.178
While the DRBC is an important example of interstate co-
operation regarding environmental protection, in the context of 
fracking its limitations will likely come to define it more than 
its successes. First, there are serious questions regarding the 
legitimate scope of the DRBC’s jurisdiction over fracking. The 
DRBC was developed in 1961, long before fracking was an issue 
in the region, and arguably, its mandate does not extend to the 
regulation of fracking.
  
179
Second, the regulations have yet to be approved by the 
member states and it is unclear whether they ever will be. 
Pennsylvania believes that the DRBC should limit its regula-
tions to issues of water withdrawal and wastewater manage-
ment, and leave all other regulations to the state, such as 
wastewater discharge permits, residual waste management, 
well construction and operation activities, and erosion and sed-
iment control.
  
180 Similarly, New York has asked the DRBC to 
halt all efforts to complete and publish draft regulations, be-
lieving they are duplicative of state regulations and unneces-
sary.181
Third, the DRBC’s purview over water use and contamina-
tion does not cover the full range of problems posed by fracking. 
Issues such as air pollution, as well as the more direct and 
physical impacts of fracking, like the visual impacts, sound pol-
lution, traffic, and setbacks cannot be regulated by the 
DRBC.
 
182
 
 177. See id.  
 Indeed, the DRBC has left many of these issues up to 
 178. See Draft Natural Gas Development Regulations, DEL. RIVER BASIN 
COMM’N, http://www.nj.gov/drbc/programs/natural/draft-regulations.html (last 
modified Nov. 7, 2012).  
 179. See Osofsky & Wiseman, Hybrid Energy, supra note 98, at 26 (stating 
many “have questioned the authority of the [DRBC] to interpret its jurisdic-
tional mandate so broadly”). 
 180. See Letter from Michael L. Krancer, Sec’y, Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., to 
Carol Collier, Exec. Dir., Del. River Basin Comm’n (Apr. 11, 2011), available at 
http://www.state.nj.us/drbc/library/documents/NGC/Agencies/PADEP041111 
.pdf (noting that additional DRBC oversight would be “duplicative and unnec-
essary”). 
 181. See Letter from James M. Tierney, Assistant Comm’r for Water Res., 
N.Y. State Dep’t. of Envtl. Conservation, to Carol Collier, Exec. Dir., Del. Riv-
er Basin Comm’n (Apr. 15, 2011), available at http://www.state.nj.us/drbc/ 
library/documents/NGC/Agencies/NYSDEC041511.pdf. 
 182. See Congressman Matt Cartwright Joins Advocacy Groups to Discuss 
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state regulation, which leaves local governments with the same 
preemption problems they faced before. 
Ultimately, while the DRBC is a useful model for a cooper-
ative approach to regulating fracking, as it stands it has inade-
quate support and authority to go forward with the regulatory 
process and does not address many of the concerns most rele-
vant to local governments.  
III.  MOVING PAST PREEMPTION   
Despite some efforts to enhance cooperation between state 
and local governments, the analysis above shows that the trend 
in states has been to preempt local government control over 
fracking. A solution to the regulation of fracking must include 
increasing the involvement and control of local governments, 
because they are best suited to understand the impacts of 
fracking on the character and environment of their communi-
ties. 
A. THE IMPORTANCE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT CONTROL OVER 
FRACKING 
In the context of fracking, the interests of state and local 
governments diverge. Although the state statutes described 
above contain statements related to protecting the health and 
welfare of communities and the environment, the primary pur-
pose of these statutes is to promote the development of natural 
resources, and they are written to facilitate the growth of the 
industry.183 Government officials who operate at a state-wide 
level are less likely than local officials to notice or be concerned 
with how fracking affects particular communities,184 and local 
officials often do not have the resources to advocate for their in-
terests.185
 
Potential Impacts of Fracking Near National Parks and Trails, APPALACHIAN 
MOUNTAIN CLUB (July 15, 2013), http://www.outdoors.org/about/newsroom/ 
press/2013/fracking-national-parks.cfm. 
 Fracking has an intense impact on the character of 
the land, and its effects are felt most by the communities in 
 183. See, e.g., Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, La Plata Cnty. v. Bowen/Edwards 
Assocs., 830 P.2d 1045, 1057 (Colo. 1992) (“The state’s interest in oil and gas 
development is centered primarily on the efficient production and utilization 
of the natural resources in the state.”). 
 184. See Long, supra note 85, at 20 (highlighting that western communities 
are “incredibly diverse”). 
 185. See Weiland, Preemption Implications, supra note 14, at 498 (describ-
ing the Town of Wendell’s small population and lack of resources as an imped-
iment to successfully lobbying state officials). 
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which it takes place.186 Preemption eliminates the ability of 
these communities to make land-use decisions tailored to local-
ized concerns and to deal specifically with the impacts of 
fracking on the environment, roads, other local infrastructure, 
and quality of life.187 Because states such as Colorado have tak-
en a ceiling approach to preemption, local communities are un-
able to create stricter regulations that might be necessary to 
address particular localized impacts of the industry.188
B. A NEW MODEL FOR CREATING AND IMPLEMENTING FRACKING 
REGULATIONS 
 The con-
tinuing legal and political battles over fracking indicate that lo-
cal governments and communities are dissatisfied with the how 
state governments have taken away their powers over the de-
velopment and use of land. Local governments must have 
greater power to regulate fracking.  
The solution proposed by this Note attempts to balance the 
interests of local governments with continued development of 
the natural gas industry in a way that has not yet been at-
tempted or specifically proposed in the context of the regulation 
of fracking. Some authors propose increased federal regulation 
over fracking.189 Although a federal regime may improve certain 
aspects of the fracking process, such as disclosure of chemicals 
and waste disposal, federal law would not address the unique 
local concerns of communities related to siting, and other local-
ized community and environmental impacts. Furthermore, 
natural gas drilling enjoys open support from both sides of the 
political aisle, and Congress and the President appear uninter-
ested in imposing federal regulations on fracking.190 Other au-
thors suggest simply preserving traditional local control over 
the siting of fracking operations.191
 
 186. See Spence, supra note 
 Siting power alone, howev-
2, at 444 (“These operations fundamentally 
change the character of an area for the duration of fracking activities.”). 
 187. See Perkins, supra note 114, at 51.  
 188. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 189. See generally Wiseman, supra note 43 (discussing the need for federal 
regulation of fracking). But see Spence, supra note 2, at 506 (calling for “nar-
row federal regulation only”). 
 190. See, e.g., Kevin Begos, Obama Fracking Support in Climate Speech 
Worries Environmental Groups, HUFFINGTON POST (June 27, 2013, 5:31 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/27/obama-fracking-support_n_ 
3510651.html (discussing President Obama’s climate change speech in which 
he expressed his support for increased use of “cleaner-burning natural gas”). 
 191. See generally Kennedy, supra note 44 (suggesting the “uniform en-
forcement of local zoning laws without special treatment for the oil and gas 
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er, does not give local governments enough power to control the 
fracking operation in a way that will protect their communities. 
Suggestions for comprehensive state statutes, such as those 
used by Pennsylvania, often work to further diminish local 
power.192
The solution proposed in this Note seeks not only to keep 
preemption at bay by retaining local siting control, but also to 
give local governments an active and meaningful role in the 
creation of regulations that allow them to protect their commu-
nities’ unique interests. This solution builds on the cooperative 
models attempted in Colorado and by the Delaware River Basin 
Commission, but addresses their main weakness, which is the 
lack of formal and meaningful involvement of local government 
representatives in these commissions. The inclusion of local 
representatives in the regulatory and permitting process is 
necessary to address the consequences of fracking that have an 
immediate impact on communities.  
 
To that end, regional or state-level organizations should be 
created and given regulatory authority over fracking. Such an 
organization could be created by state compacts, an increasing-
ly used tool in the context of electricity transmission,193 by ex-
ecutive order like the Colorado Commission,194 by state statute, 
or perhaps by an act of Congress, like the DRBC.195 Ideally, a 
regional organization would align with the location of natural 
gas deposits. This would encourage interstate cooperation in 
many cases, allow for the creation of region-wide standards, 
and bring together coalitions of local government groups that 
have similar concerns regarding fracking.196
However, given the DRBC’s lack of success in facilitating 
an agreement between the member states regarding regula-
  
 
industry”); Smith, supra note 35 (arguing that local municipal control over oil 
and gas activities should be preserved, pursuant to traditional zoning powers). 
 192. See generally Neese, supra note 146 (suggesting a comprehensive oil 
and gas statute that clearly defines the balance of power between state and 
local governments). 
 193. See Osofsky & Wiseman, Hybrid Energy, supra note 98, at 50.  
 194. See Neese, supra note 146, at 565. 
 195. See Del. River Basin Compact of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-328, 75 Stat. 
688; Osofsky & Wiseman, Hybrid Energy, supra note 98, at 22 (“Rather than 
continuing to litigate water disputes, the states, with Congress’s approval, en-
tered into a compact . . . .”); About DRBC, DEL. RIVER BASIN COMM’N, 
http://www.state.nj.us/drbc/about/ (last modified July 3, 2013). 
 196. See generally Hannah Wiseman, Expanding Regional Renewable Gov-
ernance, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 477 (2011) (discussing the benefits of re-
gional organizations to govern renewable energy development). 
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tion,197
More important than the exact geographic scope of the or-
ganization, however, is its composition. The Colorado Commis-
sion and the DRBC both fall short because neither allow the di-
rect involvement of local officials in the regulatory process.
 state-level organizations may be preferable, easier to 
create, and more efficient in reaching agreements regarding the 
regulation of fracking. In light of continued opposition to 
fracking, states may be willing to look for avenues through 
which they can quell local opposition while allowing for the de-
velopment of the industry. Local officials may also prefer a 
state-level organization, because there would be fewer conflict-
ing voices and their concerns would be more readily heard. A 
state-level body, created by state statute, would provide a set-
ting that could facilitate cooperation between state and local 
government. 
198 In 
a new organization, there should be representatives from state-
level environmental agencies and an equal or greater number 
of representatives from communities where fracking is taking 
place. Preferably, these officials would have some background 
in land-use planning and zoning, and understand the unique 
impacts that fracking has on communities. To make the organi-
zation more manageable, each locality with fracking could ap-
point one representative to the organization, where a percent-
age of those representatives would be chosen or elected to be 
part of the group that creates regulations. The remaining rep-
resentatives would not be directly involved with creating regu-
lations, but would vote on final regulations. In addition, these 
representatives would be immediately involved when a permit 
application for their particular locality is submitted. In this 
way, the organization can utilize the knowledge that local offi-
cials have of a specific area199
The composition of these organizations must also address 
issues of “industry capture,” when the interests of the industry 
end up controlling the creation of regulations. Concerns regard-
ing industry capture of the Colorado Commission limits its in-
tegrity as the primary regulatory authority over gas and oil de-
velopment, and calls into question this organization’s ability to 
 and allow them to offer input re-
garding sensitive natural features, community development 
concerns, and neighborhood and environmental impacts. 
 
 197. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 198. See supra Part II.B. 
 199. See supra Part III.A. 
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represent the interests of citizens.200 A new organization should 
be primarily composed of public representatives, as described 
above. At the same time, it is clear that industry representa-
tives often have the most up-to-date technical knowledge of oil 
and gas operations.201
The primary goal of the organization should be to promul-
gate binding regulations, which should be continuously evalu-
ated and modified based on new information about fracking as 
it develops. This power to create binding regulations would 
come through the state statute or other mechanism creating 
the organization. A key goal of the organization should be to 
determine when a particular regulation can be a baseline and 
when a regulation must be uniform across a region or state. 
Baseline regulations should be used whenever they might be 
necessary to protect the unique features of local communities 
without placing an unreasonable burden on industry.
 These individuals could therefore be in-
volved in creating general regulations, but their voting pres-
ence should be minimal.  
202 These 
could include setbacks, barriers to address noise and visual im-
pacts, and regulations regarding truck traffic and other im-
pacts on infrastructure.203
This organization should also be given permitting authori-
ty over oil and gas development. When an application for a 
permit is received, the local official from the community in 
which development will take place should be involved through-
out the entire permitting process to ensure the community’s 
concerns are addressed. This organization will not eliminate 
 These are issues that should often be 
addressed differently, based on the character, geography, land-
scape, and environmental features of a particular community. 
When uniform regulations are necessary, including local gov-
ernments in the process of creating and revising these regula-
tions will help ensure that these regulations are strong and 
concerns of communities are addressed.  
 
 200. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 201. See Osofsky & Wiseman, Hybrid Energy, supra note 98, at 1 (noting 
that private actors possess the most information regarding the technical as-
pects of shale gas development). 
 202. See Nancy D. Perkins, Principled Preemption in an Age of Interest 
Convergence: Preserving the Distinction Between Pennsylvania’s Environmen-
tal Regulation and Local Land Use Regulation, 47 DUQ. L. REV. 27, 84 (2009) 
(“[L]egislature[s] . . . should decide whether state standards establish a regu-
latory ceiling or floor, weighing the advantages and disadvantages of each op-
tion.”). 
 203. See supra Part I.A. 
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conflict regarding the regulations, but may minimize it if local 
governments feel their interests are being adequately repre-
sented.  
The primary issue that will arise in the context of this type 
of organization is overlapping regulation, which was a problem 
with the DRBC.204
Ultimately, however, the atmosphere across the country 
may not be supportive of the creation of such organizations, but 
it is possible that this situation will change in coming years. 
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is conducting 
a study on the effects of fracking, and is set to release a draft of 
its findings in 2014, with the complete findings to follow.
 However, unlike the DRBC, which has lim-
ited jurisdiction, these organizations should have full regulato-
ry authority over fracking. Political will is another concern, and 
in places like Pennsylvania where fracking has progressed sub-
stantially, the opportunities for cooperation may be more lim-
ited. State-level officials may not want to hamper the develop-
ment of natural gas, and local officials may still think that such 
an organization would not go far enough to protect their inter-
ests. However, the best place to propose and experiment with 
such an organization may be a state like New York or other 
states where fracking is in its early stages. The government in 
New York has already proved willing to listen to concerns of cit-
izens and local governments by extending the moratorium on 
fracking. Furthermore, because New York courts have upheld 
local fracking bans, these bans could make it very difficult for 
the state to profit from the development of natural gas re-
sources if most or all municipalities simply enact bans. This 
combination of factors may be conducive to the creation of a 
new organization that gives local representatives a voice in the 
regulatory process, while allowing for the development of natu-
ral gas resources. Even in other states, however, creating such 
an organization could facilitate greater cooperation between 
state and local governments, reducing conflict and the need for 
litigation. 
205
 
 204. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 This 
study may prompt renewed state and local efforts to create 
strong regulations. Alternatively, the EPA itself may require 
new state-wide regulations, which could aid in creating an at-
mosphere of greater cooperation. In addition to the possibilities 
 205. See EPA’s Study of Hydraulic Fracturing and Its Potential Impact on 
Drinking Water Resources, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/hfstudy/ 
(last updated Aug. 21, 2013).  
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of new information, the fracking boom will likely stabilize in 
coming years, particularly as natural gas prices continue to 
drop.206 Given the Obama Administration’s strong support for 
fracking207
  CONCLUSION   
 and the excitement surrounding home-grown ener-
gy, it is clear that fracking will not disappear. But as fracking 
becomes a more normal part of our energy culture, concerned 
citizens and environmentalists hope that an atmosphere for 
properly addressing the short- and long-term impacts of 
fracking will soon arise.  
The combination of horizontal drilling and hydraulic frac-
turing has led to an energy revolution in the United States. 
However, tapping these vast deposits of natural gas comes at a 
cost to the communities located above them. In the absence of 
federal regulation, state and local governments have been em-
broiled in legal and political disputes regarding the scope of 
their respective regulatory authority. As state governments 
push the boundaries of preemption, local governments are in-
creasingly powerless to control the effects of this industry on 
their communities and the environment. Although local gov-
ernments have retained some power over fracking through the 
court system and citizen activism, on the whole they are being 
forced to sit back and watch this industry invade their commu-
nities.  
The issues discussed in this Note also have applications far 
beyond the fracking industry. Disputes regarding the appropri-
ate balance of state and local control can arise in the context of 
any industrial activity that has significant impacts on local 
communities. Particularly when technological developments 
outpace the creation of regulations, there is more reason for 
communities to have concerns about the short- and long-term 
effects of an industry. State preemption of local land use laws 
forces local governments to bear the burdens of an industry and 
denies them the ability to create regulations to protect their 
communities. Although the prospect of a century’s worth of 
home-grown energy is not one that should be lightly dismissed, 
 
 206. See Natural Gas Prices Drop to Lowest Level in a Decade, AM. PUBLIC 
MEDIA (Apr. 12, 2012), http://www.marketplace.org/topics/sustainability/ 
natural-gas-prices-drop-lowest-level-decade (reflecting a recent drop in natural 
gas prices, but suggesting that fracking may not be “worth the trouble” at the-
se prices). 
 207. See Begos, supra note 190.  
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citizens and local governments have legitimate and substantial 
concerns about the myriad of known and unknown effects of the 
fracking industry. These individuals and communities must be 
given a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to have their 
concerns addressed 
Communities need a new mechanism through which they 
are given a voice in the creation of regulations to govern 
fracking. Local representatives must be involved in the regula-
tory process because they are in the best position to understand 
the unique concerns of their communities. The use of express 
preemption in Pennsylvania and New York has greatly con-
strained local control over fracking. The attempts at coopera-
tive models in Colorado and the Delaware River Basin have 
failed to give local representatives a meaningful role in these 
organizations. New regional or state-wide organizations, with 
regulatory authority, should be created to bring together state 
and local representatives to create and revise regulations and 
issue permits. An organization which involves state and local 
representatives can help to ensure that the interests of com-
munities are represented from the day an application is filed 
until the day a well is dry. These organizations will allow for 
the development of natural gas resources while preserving the 
ability of local governments to protect the health, safety and 
welfare of their communities. 
 
